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Abstract: 
Drawing on the PISA 2006 data set, this study examines the impact of school’s socio-
economic composition on the science test scores of Spanish students enrolled in 
compulsory secondary education. We define school’s composition in terms of the average 
parental human capital of students at that same school. These contextual peer effects are 
estimated using a semi-parametric methodology, which enables spillovers to affect all the 
parameters in the educational production function. We also deal with the potential 
problem of student self-selection into specific schools by using an artificial sorting 
mechanism, which we believe to be independent of a student’s unobserved abilities. The 
results indicate that the association between a school’s socio-economic composition and 
test score results is clearly positive and significantly higher when computed using a semi-
parametric approach. However, we find that the endogenous sorting of students into 
schools also plays a fundamental role, given that spillovers are significantly reduced 
when this selection process is eliminated from our measure of school’s composition 
effects. Specifically, the estimations suggest that contextual peer effects are moderately 
positive only in those schools where the socio-economic composition is comparatively 
high. In addition, we find some evidence of asymmetry as to how the external effects and 
the sorting process actually operate, apparently affecting males and females and high and 
low performance students differently. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates school composition effects on Spain’s lower-secondary schools 
(Educación Secundaria Obligatoria, ESO), using PISA data from 2006, and as such is the 
first study to examine this question explicitly in the Spanish case. Quantifying the impact of 
the socio-economic composition of Spain’s schools is especially important in this country 
because, where there is an excess of demand — as is common in large cities — the admission 
process in public and public-funded (concertada) private schools is very closely related to 
zoning laws and school district policies. Therefore, given that school admission criteria 
assign greatest weight to the proximity of the student’s home to the school, these educational 
policies are inextricably linked to the effects of the schools’ socio-economic mix. In fact, they 
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may result in the direct transfer of the existing socio-economic residential segregation into 
the schools (Hoxby 2000, Gorard et al. 2003). Moreover, school composition effects might 
have gained additional relevance in Spain as a result of the significant increase in the number 
of immigrant students from less affluent social backgrounds in recent years and the 
subsequent interaction with existing zoning laws — i.e. less advantaged immigrant families 
tend to reside within ethnic enclaves and, as a consequence, their children inevitably tend to 
concentrate in schools characterised by a low socio-economic composition.    
Empirically, there are many channels via which the features of an individual’s 
schoolmates or classmates — namely, the peer effects — might influence individual 
attainment. In the general framework proposed by Manski (1993, 2000), the overall effect of 
the peer group on individual outcomes primarily involves elements of social interaction that 
include both endogenous and contextual (or exogenous) effects. The former are the direct 
effects that peer behaviour or outcomes can have on individual outcomes; that is, students 
may well learn more because their school/classmates learn more. The latter are the impact 
that certain exogenous characteristics of the peer group can have on a student’s achievement 
— i.e. individual performance depends on the socio-economic composition of his/her group. 
In addition, the extent of peer effects might be confounded by the presence of shared 
environmental/school elements or individual characteristics (e.g. cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills) that go unobserved by the econometrician; the so-called contextual effects.  
Obtaining separate estimates of endogenous and contextual effects is fraught with 
empirical complications1 and, moreover, is highly data-demanding. Thus, this study concerns 
itself solely with contextual effects, which has been a fairly common approach in the 
empirical literature to date. More specifically, this paper uses a broad measure of the socio-
economic composition of schools, based on the average parental educational background 
(defined as the highest educational level completed by either one of the two parents) for each 
school. Its main contribution to the existing literature consists in the implementation of a 
semi-parametric methodology that allows school-contextual effects to influence all 
parameters in the educational production function (as such, adapting the original proposal 
made by Raymond & Roig 2010). Intuitively, taking as a reference the most disadvantaged 
schools in terms of their socio-economic composition (i.e. schools in the lowest quintile of 
average parental background), the paper shows that moving to better endowed schools might 
generate a level shift as well as various potential gradient shifts. Indeed, the measure of 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, what is commonly referred to as reflection problems, which involve the simultaneous determination of 
achievement for all students within a peer group (i.e. a simultaneity bias problem). 
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contextual peer effects proposed here should capture the global impact of school composition 
on the educational production function. In addition, the flexible strategy adopted ensures that 
such school composition effects are non-linear, since they are separately computed for each 
successive quintile of the schools’ average parental education.    
Finally, the paper deals with the most common problem encountered in such studies, 
namely the self-selection of students into different schools (i.e. a specific type of correlated 
effect). Specifically, the presence of a sorting mechanism that allocates those students that are 
better endowed of unobserved characteristics into schools with higher average parental 
schooling might bias our measure of peer effects. Therefore, an alternative sorting 
mechanism is provided that can be assumed to be unrelated to an individual student’s 
unobserved characteristics. Such reordering is based on the predicted linear score, obtained 
from an ordered probit model that estimates the probability of membership in each quintile of 
the schools’ average parental education. This artificial sorting is then used to reduce selection 
bias in the definition of reference and non-reference groups. Thus, the study is able to provide 
a measure of a school’s composition effects that is significantly less affected by correlated 
effects.   
 With these purposes in mind, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
contains a brief review of selected papers examining peer effects, focusing on the various 
estimation strategies adopted to eliminate correlated effects. Section 3 describes the empirical 
methodology that is used in this study and Section 4 is dedicated to a description of the data. 
Section 5 contains the empirical results, as well as a robustness check and an analysis of the 
potential asymmetries of school composition effects. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Selected Contributions 
 
Previous studies of peer effects on scholastic achievement present quite mixed findings 
and, to date, there is no unified evidence as to the existence or to the actual form that these 
effects might take. This line of research has sought to capture these potential spillovers at 
several points in the educational process (from primary to tertiary stages), and by considering 
different peer features (actual or lagged peers’ test scores, ethnic and socio-economic 
composition of the peer group, etc.). This points to the fact that the resulting spillovers will 
be either positive or negative (or even zero), while dependent at all times on the nature of the 
peer variables, and as such the final net effects become an empirical question. Furthermore, 
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governed primarily by data availability, the definition of these peer groups has been markedly 
heterogeneous, ranging from school, school-by-grade and classroom to other social peers 
such as roommates or friends. As a result, the findings tend to be highly case-specific and not 
always strictly comparable. In general, this lack of explicit comparability is attributable to i) 
the specific characteristics of the sample used, and ii) the (subsequent) econometric technique 
adopted in identifying peer effects other than the correlated effects. 
Interestingly, some studies are based on special samples in which students are assigned 
randomly into peer groups, thereby possibly eliminating the bias attributable to correlated 
effects. More specifically, such quasi-experimental studies exploit the randomized trials 
generated by the chance matching of students with first-year roommates in college 
accommodation (see Sacerdote 2001, Zimmerman 2003, Foster 2006 and Brunello et al. 2010 
among others), or class assignment on the basis of surname during first year university 
courses (De Paola & Scoppa 2010).  
Several other papers, which focus principally on primary and secondary schools, adopt 
fixed effect frameworks in order to control for any potential bias in peer effect estimates. For 
example, McEwan (2003) controls for both school and family fixed effects when estimating 
peer contextual effects at the classroom level, finding a positive and slightly concave effect of 
the classroom mean of the mothers’ education. Hanushek et al. (2003) exploits a unique panel 
dataset covering three successive cohorts of students; hence, they are able to control for 
individual, school and school-by-grade fixed effects in a value-added specification of the 
educational production function. They report a positive effect of mean peer achievement on 
improvements recorded in test scores, which remains almost constant over the test score 
distribution. They also found no important effect of the average family income of the peers 
and test score heterogeneity in the peer group. Lavy et al. (2008) exploit cohort-to-cohort and 
within-school changes in the proportion of low achievers (i.e. their proxy of peer ability) to 
identify endogenous peer effects and the mechanisms via which they impact on an 
individual’s own achievement. They report a clear negative impact of the proportion of low 
achievers in the classroom, which tends to be more pronounced for students of low socio-
economic backgrounds2. Ammermuller & Pischke (2009) consider the contextual effects in 
primary schools for several European countries (using PIRLS data). They consider that 
contextual peer effects at the classroom level are captured by the average number of books at 
home. These peer effects are identified by exploiting variations across the classrooms within 
                                                 
2
 Moreover, their results also suggest that the negative impact of the proportion of low achievers mainly operates via the 
disruptive influence it has on teachers’ pedagogical practices, interaction with other students and classroom disorder. 
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the same grade for the same cohort of students (once established that these classes had been 
formed in what was a largely random manner). Their results indicate that, in general, 
contextual peer effects do exist; however, they also point out that simple OLS estimations 
might be equally affected by selection bias as well as by measurement error in the peer 
variable, which tend to operate in opposite directions.   
The present study is most closely related to those undertaken by Fertig (2003), 
Schneeweis & Winter-Ebmer (2007) and Rangvid (2007), which also draw on PISA data. 
Specifically, Fertig (2003) investigates the effect of reading achievement heterogeneity in US 
schools, which is identified through Instrumental Variables (IV)3 — namely, dummies for 
private and selective schools and a set of variables related to the prevalence of parental caring 
behaviour in each school. His results indicate that attending a heterogeneous school in terms 
of student achievement undermines individual performance; however, the negative effect he 
reports appears to be excessive when estimated using IV (which raises the question about the 
validity of the instruments used).  
The paper by Schneeweis & Winter-Ebmer (2007) explores the effect of socio-economic 
composition at the school-by-grade level in Austria. The authors present evidence obtained, 
on the one hand, from OLS estimations based on an extensive set of individual and school 
controls and, on the other hand, from the application of school fixed effects. They argue that, 
when accounting for school type — given the marked track system in Austrian lower and 
upper secondary schools — school fixed effects reduce the selection bias in the estimation of 
peer effects. Their results highlight a significant asymmetry in the peer effects on reading4, 
which seems to have a more beneficial effect in the case of students of a low socio-economic 
background. Moreover, they also adopt a quantile regression strategy, which reveals that 
students in the lower part of the ability distribution are more positively affected by the socio-
economic composition of their peer group.  
Finally, Rangvid (2007) analyses the effect of the socio-economic composition of a 
school in terms of the three PISA subjects (reading, maths and science) drawing on Danish 
data, which are complemented with administrative registers to overcome the potential 
problems caused by the limited sample of students within each school5. Given the 
                                                 
3
 Other papers in which the identification of peer effects relies on IV strategies include those by Feinstein & Symons (1999) 
and Robertson & Symons (2003), where the instruments consist of location variables and teacher assessment of a student’s 
previous ability combined with region of birth dummies, respectively. 
4
 By contrast, they also suggest that the apparent peer effects in mathematics, as estimated by OLS, are due only to selection 
effects, given that their fixed-effect estimates are not statistically significant. Additionally, in this case, peer group 
heterogeneity seems to play a very limited role in explaining test score attainment. 
5
 As argued by Micklewright et al. (2010), the limited student sampling made by PISA can result in a measurement error in 
the estimation of peer effects. This would bias the effect of school composition towards zero. Unfortunately, such 
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comprehensive nature of the Danish secondary school education system, the author cannot 
rely on the school-fixed effect estimation as was the case in Schneeweis & Winter-Ebmer 
(2007); indeed, she cannot assume that individuals (and their families) who are placed in a 
given school of a certain track share similar unobserved characteristics6. Her identification 
strategy is instead based on controlling for a large set of individual, family and school 
variables, without explicitly considering the role of selection on unobservable features. The 
results in this study suggest a clear positive effect of attending a school with a higher socio-
economic composition in the middle of the test score distribution, whereas no significant 
effect is found for the socio-economic heterogeneity at the school level. Moreover, the 
quantile estimation reveals that school composition effects tend to be higher for low-ability 
students on the reading test score, but the author finds a U-shaped effect for science, which 
means that low and high ability students benefit equally from a better socio-economic school 
composition.    
 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
 
The estimation strategy proposed in this paper represents a step forward in terms of the 
measurement of peer effects. Indeed, the main innovation with respect to previous studies 
consists, as briefly commented in the introduction, in the idea that the spillovers produced by 
an improvement in a school’s socio-economic composition may affect not only the intercept, 
but all the parameters of the educational production function. This original proposal has been 
taken (and adapted) from the paper by Raymond & Roig (2010), in which they estimate the 
externality produced by the average human capital of workers in the same firm. In keeping 
with this externality, this paper takes as its starting point the standard educational production 
function, 
 
, ,i s s i s i sT X Zα β δ ε′ ′= + + +         (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
administrative data are not available for public use in the Spanish case; therefore, it should be borne in mind that the 
estimates reported in this study represent a lower boundary of the true impact of school-average parental education. 
6
 Notice that since the LOGSE reform of 1990, the Spanish secondary education system has been compulsory and 
comprehensive until the age of sixteen, which (as in the case of Denmark) makes the school-fixed effect framework 
unfeasible for controlling endogenous peer group selection. See section 3 for details as to how such a problem is addressed 
in this paper.  
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where test score Ti,s of student i in school s depends on a set of individual and family 
characteristics (Xi) as well as on a set of school characteristics (Zs), plus a composite error 
term (εi,s). Usually, exogenous peer effects are simply estimated by considering that the 
intercept term (αs) is not fixed, but instead dependent on an average characteristic of the peer 
group — i.e. in this case, the average parental education of students at that school s ( sPE ). 
This means that the intercept term in (1) can be rewritten as, 
( )ss PEα α µ= + ⋅          (1a) 
which indicates that a unit increase in the average parental education in the school modifies 
the mean test score by µ points, through a shift in the intercept term. We could also adopt a 
non-linear specification, where the impact of the school’s composition of parental human 
capital is allowed to vary for each successive quintile of school-average parental education 
( ( ), 1,..,5sjQ PE j = ). In this case, the intercept term in (1) can be expressed as, 
( )51
2
s
s j j
j
Q PEα α α
=
= + ⋅∑         (1b) 
where the contextual peer effects are now αj (j=1,..,5) and are allowed to be different for each 
quintile of average parental schooling. Even in this case, the impact of the peer group’s 
characteristics is only produced by a level effect, which operate through a modification of the 
educational production function intercept; in fact, once the expression (1b) is substituted into 
equation (1) we obtain,   
( )5, 1 ,
2
s
i s j j i s i s
j
T Q PE X Zα α β δ ε
=
′ ′= + ⋅ + + +∑ .      (2) 
This corresponds to the standard equation used in the peer effects literature, except for the 
non-linear specification of the contextual peer effects.  
Equation (2) clearly specifies that the standard approach constrains school composition 
spillovers so as to affect only the intercept term and no other parameter in the educational 
production function (even allowing for a non-linear effect). However, there is no theoretical 
reason to believe that the contextual peer effects consist only of a simple level effect. For 
example, an improvement in the socio-economic composition of the peer group might modify 
the gradient of the effect of a student’s family background and home environment on his/her 
test score. Additionally, belonging to a “good” peer group in terms of average parental human 
capital might relax the relationship between other school characteristics and an individual’s 
achievements. 
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In order to capture any potential shape effect of school composition, we consider a 
reference group, which consists of all the students who belong to the least-advantaged 
schools in terms of average parental educational background. In the present application, the 
least-advantaged schools are defined as those schools that appear in the first quintile of the 
average parental education7 (i.e. ( ) ( )ssj PEQPEQ 1= ). Therefore, the educational production 
function is separately estimated for the reference category, as in equation (3): 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1, 1 1 , , , 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ|     if Q Q Q Q Qs s si s i s i s i s i s jT Q PE X Z R Q PE Q PEα β δ ε ψ ε′ ′ ′= + + + = + = . (3) 
From the obtained parameter estimates ( ψˆ1Q ), we then proceed to forecast the test score for 
all the individuals who do not belong to the reference group, that is, 
( )( ) ( )1 1 1, 1 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ| ;      , 1Q Q Qs si s i s jT Q PE X Z i Q PE jψ α β δ′ ′= + + ∀ ∈ > .       (4) 
Finally, for each successive quintile of the school-average parental education, the measure of 
school composition spillovers presented here consists of the average difference between the 
actual and the forecasted test score within each quintile:  
( )( ) ( )1, ,1 ˆ ˆ| ;     , 1
jN
Qs
i s i s j
si
j j
j
T T Q PE
IEX i Q PE j
N
ψ
=
−
= ∀ ∈ >
∑
      (5) 
In other words, this measure of contextual peer effects consists of counterfactual 
evidence, which is based on the ceteris paribus within-quintile mean differential between the 
observed and the predicted test score, where the latter is obtained by using the parameters 
estimated for students in the least-advantaged schools. More intuitively, this methodology 
represents a semi-parametric approach to capture the ceteris paribus change in the test score, 
produced by moving a representative student from the first quintile to successive quintiles of 
the school-average parental education. Note that this measure of the effects of school 
composition captures in a semi-parametric way the change in each parameter making up the 
whole educational production function (both level and shape effects), produced by 
incrementing the average parental schooling from the first to the higher quintiles. In this way, 
we are able to provide more compelling and complete evidence about the effect of school 
                                                 
7
 As noted by Raymond & Roig (2010), the definition of the reference group is always subject to some degree of 
arbitrariness; in their case, they define the reference group as those productive establishments in which the average workers’ 
human capital is equal to or less than eight years of schooling. This definition follows the logic that eight years of education 
corresponds to the compulsory length of education under the institutional framework that was then valid for individuals in 
their sample; moreover, it should represent those firms that chiefly employ unskilled workers. In our case, we consider it 
better to define the reference group in an endogenous way — i.e. dividing the sample into quintiles and taking the first one 
as the reference group. This definition allows us  i) to consider schools as being more heterogeneous units than firms, and ii) 
to maintain a sufficient number of observations in the reference and non-reference groups.    
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composition on individual test scores, obtained without constraining these potential spillovers 
of the peer group’s socio-economic status to operate only through a shift in the intercept term. 
 
3.1 School Composition and Selection Bias 
 
This semi-parametric methodology is not, however, exempt from the most relevant 
empirical problem in the estimation of contextual peer effects, represented by the self-
selection of students into schools and peer groups. In this paper we seek to reduce the bias 
produced by the sorting mechanism that allocates those students with a greater (lesser) 
endowment of unobserved abilities into better (worse) peer groups, which may bias our 
measure of school composition effects. Indeed, were this to be the case, the test score forecast 
for non-reference group students from eq. (3) would present a downward bias, pointing to an 
overestimation of the effects of school composition. In other words, even if we tried to 
account for selection on observable variables by conditioning for a large set of individual and 
school controls (similar to Rangvid 2007, see section 4), we would not be particularly 
confident about the conditional zero mean of the error term in the test score equation 
estimated for the reference group (eq. 3).  
In line once more with Raymond & Roig (2010), rather than using a classification of 
reference and non-reference groups based on actual school-average parental education, 
students were allocated to reference and non-reference groups on the basis of their predicted 
linear score obtained from an ordered probit model, which estimates the probability of 
membership in each of the five quintiles of the average parental education at the school level. 
Specifically, we computed the predicted linear score that represents a proxy of the (latent) 
parental human capital in each school, obtained from the following equation:  

**
s s
i i i i iPE W PE Wγ µ γ′ ′= + ⇒ = ɶ         (6) 
The explanatory variables that are specifically included in the vector (Wi) in eq. (6) comprise 
a set of dummies for school availability (one, and more than one, school available) and the 
student’s age on arrival in Spain (for immigrants), as well as region and municipality size —
control variables that also appear in the test score equation (to capture unobserved school 
characteristics that are common within region and municipalities of similar dimensions). 
Subsequently, the observations are sorted according to the quintiles of the predicted linear 
score ( iWγ~ ); this proxy of the schoolmates’ parental human capital would be correlated to the 
school-average parental education, but at the same time it can be considered as independent 
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of a student’s unobserved abilities. Therefore, we take as our reference group those students 
in the first quintile of the predicted parental schooling and we estimate the test score equation 
for them as  
( )( ) ( ) ( )* * * * *1 1 1 1 1* * *, 1 1 , , , 1|     if Q Q Q Q Qi s i s i s i s i s jT Q W X Z R Q W Q Wγ α β δ ε ψ ε γ γ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′= + + + = + =⌢ ⌢⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ⌢ɶ ɶ ɶ . (7) 
It is then possible to re-compute the index of school composition spillovers in the same 
fashion as above, but now without such a marked effect of the self-selection of students into 
peer groups: 
( )( )
( ) 
*
*
1*
, , *
* *1
*
| ;
    , 1
jN
Q
i s i s j i
si
j j i j i
j
T T Q W
IEX i Q W Q PE j
N
γ ψ
γ=
′−
 
′= ∀ ∈ = > 
 
∑
⌢ɶ ɶ
ɶ .            (8) 
Similarly to the IV estimation, we exploit the between student variability of school 
availability and, in the case of immigrants, of arrival age, within municipalities of the same 
dimension within the same region. Again, in line with IV, a valid exclusion restriction is 
needed to rule out endogenous student sorting. We consider that once controlling for parental 
education, socio-economic status and many other family characteristics in the test score 
equation (see the next section for details), we can reasonably assume that the only channel 
through which school availability and age on arrival might affect a student’s test score is via 
the effect of school selection (i.e. they are independent of unobserved student characteristics). 
If this is true, eq. (7) is correctly estimated8 and the measure of socio-economic school 
composition obtained from (8) is now “clean” thanks to the potential endogenous selection of 
students into schools. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that the choice of the exclusion restrictions (school 
availability and age on arrival) is not free of criticism. It is quite obvious that both variables 
might have an effect on the probability of being in a given quintile of the school-average 
parental education. What is not so immediately obvious is the belief that, having controlled 
for a large set of family characteristics, these variables are completely orthogonal to a 
student’s unobserved characteristics. In order to ensure a greater degree of reliability for our 
results, in sub-section 5.1 we provide an intuitive falsification test for the validity of the 
exclusion restrictions used here, which is basically aimed at showing that these variables are 
                                                 
8
 Notice that the composite error term in eq. (1) may assume the general form εi,s = ηi + νs + ςi,s, which means that apart from 
individual unobserved ability (ηi), unobserved school characteristics (νs) may also cause some bias in the results. However, 
we are not able to deal explicitly with this problem using the PISA database. We are, therefore, forced to assume that the 
correlated school effects are zero once conditioned by a school’s characteristics, at least in the case of the reference group. It 
should be borne in mind that, should this assumption prove invalid, the results presented in what follows may still be 
affected by the presence of some unobserved correlated school effect. 
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not likely to contribute to school composition spillovers (but they do explain the likelihood of 
membership in reference and non-reference groups).  
 
 
4. Data Description 
 
As discussed above, the empirical analysis is based on Spanish data from the 2006 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), undertaken by the OECD (see OECD 
2009 for details). PISA focuses on the acquisition of skills in reading, mathematics and 
science among a target population of students aged 15 to 16. The 2006 assessment was 
specifically concerned with the testing of science skills and as such is the only skill 
considered in this study9. In the specific case of Spain, the students interviewed were drawn 
from a cohort of individuals born in 1990 and enrolled in lower-secondary schools 
(Educación Secundaria Obligatoria, ESO) during the survey year. As outlined earlier, 
Spanish lower-secondary education is completely comprehensive and compulsory until the 
age of 16. Normally, 15-year-old pupils will be enrolled in the 4th grade of lower-secondary 
education; however, the sample contains students from lower grades as well (3rd, 2nd and 1st 
grade), representing those who have repeated one or more grades. The original Spanish 
sample comprised 19,604 students enrolled at 686 different schools.      
The PISA survey has several statistical peculiarities that must be taken into account in the 
estimation phase. First of all, the skills assessment was carried out using five Plausible 
Values for each field, which are then normalized to obtain a global average of 500 and a 
standard deviation of 100. This technique, derived from Item Response Theory, allows 
students’ (latent) skills to be represented consistently when the number of submitted items is 
too small to represent true individual ability. Moreover, the structure of the final sample must 
also be taken into account, given that it is the product of a complex two-stage stratification 
procedure used to ensure that the entire population is represented. Specifically, the first step 
consists in the stratified selection of schools with 15- to 16-year-olds enrolled in their classes, 
with sampling probabilities that are proportional to the number of eligible students enrolled; 
in the second step, a given number of students are randomly selected within each sampled 
school (up to 35). In order to take into account the specific statistical properties of the PISA 
                                                 
9
 Despite this, the 2006 survey also contains information about reading and mathematics skills. Attention is limited here to 
the science domain for reasons of space. The results for the other two skills are qualitatively similar, and are available upon 
request from the author. 
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sample, all the statistics and estimations that we present in this study have been carried out 
with the STATA routine “pv”, specifically designed for PISA and similar surveys 
(Macdonald 2008, Lauzon 2004). 
The PISA survey contains, apart from the plausible values of the test score, an extensive 
(but often not exhaustive) battery of questions about a student’s and his/her family’s 
characteristics, as well as several other school characteristics. The empirical analysis has been 
conditioned to the information drawn from a large subset of relevant questions so as to limit 
the role of the unobservable variables (following Rangvid 2007 and the OLS specification of 
Schneeweis & Winter-Ebmer 2007, given the available variables). The whole set of control 
variables are reported in Table 1, together with the exact definition of each variable, its mean 
and standard deviation. In summary, the conditioning variables can be divided into individual 
controls (sex, grade attended, age, migration status and the language spoken at home), family 
controls (paternal and maternal education, family socio-economic status, maternal working 
situation, number of books at home and educational resources), school controls (prevalence 
of immigrants, girls and part-time teachers, lack of qualified teachers, school autonomy, 
student/teacher ratio, school size, school ownership, streaming processes, career guidance 
employee and presence of computers for instruction) and territorial controls (municipality 
size and region)10.    
     [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As usual, we also generated indicator functions for observations with missing information 
for the explanatory variables, in order to control for the non-randomness of the missing 
values; in the case of missing information, the explanatory variables are fixed as being equal 
to zero. As a measure of the socio-economic composition of the school we consider the 
school-average parental education, taking the highest educational level completed by one or 
other of the two parents11. Observations with missing information about the highest parental 
education have been discarded from the sample (2% of the total sample). Since our school 
composition measure consists in the school-average value, we also discarded the forty-two 
                                                 
10
 Notice that we also retain information about the availability of neighbouring schools within the same area and about the 
students’ age on arrival in Spain (for first generation immigrants). These are included in eq. (6) only. 
11
 The final student weight provided in the PISA database has been used in the computation of the school composition 
variable. This should reduce the imprecision in the school composition measure obtained from PISA data, where (as 
commented above) not all the students from every school are sampled. Whatever the case, the results are insensitive to the 
exclusion of the final student in the computation of the school-average parental education. Notice also that the mean peer 
characteristic is usually computed without the contribution of the individual (because this might cause a reflection problem 
when the average value of the peer group is used as an explanatory variable). In this case, where school-average parental 
education is only used to define reference and non-reference groups, this complication is not necessary; in any case, the 
results are virtually unchanged when the average parental education does not include the individual’s contribution (the 
results are available upon request). See Table 1A in the Appendix for more details about the school composition variable. 
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observations of students that are enrolled in schools with fewer than eight students. In the 
end, the sample used in the empirical analysis was formed by 19,164 students at 675 different 
schools.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Level Effects of School Composition 
 
The starting point for this empirical analysis was an estimation of the educational 
production function as described by eq. (2), in which the school composition measure was 
allowed to be non linear (dummies for school-average parental education quintiles), but 
constrained so as to produce only a level effect. As reported in Table 2, the results indicate 
that moving from the first quintile to the second quintile of average parental schooling at the 
school level had only a slightly significant impact (7 points) on the science test score. 
However, the ceteris paribus comparison between students in the first quintile and those in 
the third revealed that students in the latter group performed significantly better than the 
reference group, showing a positive score gap of about 14 points. This positive level effect of 
school composition fell somewhat when moving to the fourth quintile (11 points). Finally, the 
test score for students in the most-advantaged group in terms of school composition (fifth 
quintile) was, on average, 24 points higher than the score for students in the least-advantaged 
group. This means that an improvement in the school’s socio-economic composition had a 
substantial level effect on individual test scores, and that this appears to be non-linear in the 
quintiles of average parental human capital at the school level. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The estimates for the remaining control variables are of independent interest, and it is 
worth briefly commenting on the main findings. The increase in student age was positively 
associated with the test score, whereas females seemed to obtain worse results than males in 
science. The effect of the grade attended was as expected, given that students from lower 
grades than that of the fourth grade (the standard grade at ages 15 and 16) performed 
significantly worse. Even accounting for the language spoken at home and other family 
characteristics, first-generation immigrant students performed significantly worse than 
natives and second-generation immigrants (negative gap of 25 points). An improvement in a 
family’s socio-economic status had a marked positive effect on the science test score, while 
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only maternal education showed a significant and positive effect on a student’s competence 
for the sciences. Children of working mothers performed markedly better than those whose 
mother did not work, with a ceteris paribus average increase of 10 points in the test score. In 
addition, the number of books and a home’s endowment of educational resources also had a 
significant positive effect on the test score.  
An analysis of school control variables revealed the usual results for PISA data — i.e. 
school characteristic control variables were hardly significant when explaining students’ test 
scores. Therefore, we shall only describe in brief the few variables that displayed statistically 
significant coefficients. We detected a positive effect of the percentage of girls attending a 
school, whereas the increase in the ratio of personal computers for instruction to school size 
had a negative impact on the science test score. After accounting for family characteristics, a 
school’s socio-economic composition and other school characteristics, it was found that 
public schools performed significantly better than private and public-funded private schools. 
Finally, students enrolled at schools that can hire teachers autonomously seemed to achieve 
better results than their counterparts. The evidence obtained from the territorial control 
variables indicated that being schooled in a large city has a positive effect on science 
attainment; moreover, the coefficient associated with regional dummies (not shown here) 
suggested that Catalonia and the Basque Country performed significantly worse than the rest 
of Spain’s regions.    
 
 5.2 Accounting for Shape Effects and for Selection Bias 
  
The results obtained from the estimation of eq. (2) suggest a significant and positive 
effect of the school’s socio-economic composition. However, as previously highlighted, this 
result may merely represent partial or incomplete evidence, given that we implicitly 
constrained the impact of the school-average parental education so as to affect only average 
attainments (i.e. the intercept of the educational production function). In order to capture any 
other potential slope effect produced by an improvement in the school endowment of parental 
human capital, we implemented the innovative methodology described above in section 312.  
Panel A of Table 3 contains the estimated value of our measure of school composition 
spillovers (eq. 5). We computed IEXj separately for each quintile of the school-average 
                                                 
12
 The estimates of the educational production functions for the reference group (eq. 3 and eq. 7) are not reported here for 
reasons of space, but are available upon request; in general, the results are conventional and qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 2.  
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parental education and also calculated the mean value for all the quintiles (except that of the 
first, which is the reference category). The results from the semi-parametric methodology 
confirmed that the effect of the parental education of the peer group was substantial and 
clearly non-linear. As in the previous case, moving from the least-advantaged group to the 
second quintile of the school’s socio-economic composition had almost no effect on 
individual test scores (almost 5 points, but not statistically different from zero), whereas the 
step to the third quintile produced a positive increase of about 12 points. However, the 
movement to higher quintiles generated substantial (and positive) slope effects, which were 
hidden by the implicit constrains of eq. (2). Indeed, school composition effects could be 
quantified into 26 additional test score points for students in the fourth quintile of the average 
parental schooling and up to 71 points for students in the highest quintile. Additionally, the 
mean value for all the non-reference groups was also statistically significant, approaching 28 
test score points.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
However, these results may well be biased by the fact that students with a better 
endowment of unobserved abilities are more likely to enrol in the better schools (in terms, 
that is, of their socio-economic composition). In order to reduce this potential selection bias, 
we first estimated eq. (6) using an ordered probit model, the dependent variable of which was 
the five quintiles of the actual school-average parental education. The estimates (see Table 
2A in the Appendix) indicate that immigrant pupils who arrived in Spain at an earlier date are 
significantly more likely to be enrolled in schools where their schoolmates’ parental 
education is higher; moreover, conditional on region and municipality size, the chances of 
being in better schools is also higher for those who reside closer to other schools. In general, 
the variables included provide a satisfactory explanation of the probability of being in each of 
the quintiles of the school-average parental education. Subsequently, we used the predicted 
linear score to obtain a proxy of the school-average parental human capital that was 
independent of the students’ unobserved characteristics.  
When students were sorted into reference and non-reference groups according to the 
predicted linear score, the evidence concerning school composition spillovers was markedly 
different. As reported in the lower panel of Table 3, the mean effect for all the non-reference 
groups was statistically non existent, which is the result of a clear convexity of school 
composition effects with respect to the different quintiles of sPE (the same information is 
depicted in Figure 1). In fact, students from the second quintile of the proxied average 
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parental education were penalized by about 10 points with respect to pupils at the least-
advantaged schools (i.e. the reference group), and the spillover effects for students in the 
third quintile were not statistically different from zero. In addition, when the selective sorting 
of pupils into schools was accounted for, the effect of school composition was strongly 
reduced for students enrolled in the better endowed schools (about 15 test score points for 
both the fourth and the fifth quintiles). This evidence suggests that, especially for students in 
the highest quintile of the average parental schooling, there is a considerable sorting process 
in their favour with respect to less-advantaged students. Summing up, a significant contextual 
peer effect was still detected, but it seemed to generate a positive and modest spillover only 
in those schools where the average level of parental education was higher. However, the 
process of student sorting would seem to be even more important than the externality 
produced by the socio-economic origins of an individual’s schoolmates.          
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks  
 
The evidence presented above sought to determine whether a more favourable school 
composition produced better individual results in the science test score (ceteris paribus). The 
baseline results seem to suggest that the exogenous characteristics of an individual’s 
schoolmates (the contextual peer effect, here defined in terms of parental education) exert a 
positive externality on the individual acquisition process of competence in this field. This 
spillover was even higher when we considered not only the level effect, but also the whole 
slope effects in the educational production function. However, these results are likely to have 
been confounded by the presence of an endogenous sorting process that allocated the students 
with a better endowment of unobserved abilities to the better schools (in terms of their socio-
economic composition). On attempting to reduce this potential bias, the results are markedly 
different: there was a small and positive effect of the school’s socio-economic composition 
only in those schools where the average level of parental education was considerably higher.   
Whatever the case, these results might still be biased if the variables used as exclusion 
restrictions had been systematically related to a student’s unobserved ability. Recall that the 
validity of these results is based on the assumption that, having controlled for the father’s and 
mother’s education, the family’s socio-economic status, migration status, language spoken at 
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home and other family characteristics, the presence of one or more available schools and the 
arrival age for immigrant children are unrelated to the unobserved abilities. Unfortunately, 
there is no formal way to prove the validity of this assumption, given that it involves 
elements that are, by definition, unobservable. Even so, we have provided an intuitive 
falsification test, which helps us to corroborate our excludability assumption. This test is 
based on the idea that if the excluded variables had had some effect on the test score equation 
(even via correlation with the unobservable), including them in the equation for the reference 
group would have modified the results obtained with our measure of peer effects. In fact, the 
logic behind the exclusion restrictions is that these variables only affect the test score (for the 
reference group) through their effect on the probability of being in each quintile of the 
school-average parental education.     
First, we performed several statistical tests to analyse the significance of the variables 
excluded from the educational production function; the results (not shown here) suggest that 
both variables (individually and jointly) do not differ from zero at any conventional level of 
significance. Moreover, we gradually included the dummies for school availability and age 
on arrival in the test score equations (3) and (7) and, then, we recomputed the measures of 
school composition effects (5) and (8), without and with the endogenous sorting correction 
respectively. The results, reported in Table 4, showed i) the baseline measure of spillovers to 
be indistinguishable from the original one computed without the excluded variables; in 
addition, ii) the results were only slightly different (but identical in statistical terms) when 
students were re-sorted into reference and non-reference groups according to eq. (6) and the 
two variables were included in the test score equation for the reference group. In principle, if 
the excluded variables had had an effect on a student’s test score and/or had contributed to 
explain a school’s composition effects, we would have observed a marked alteration in the 
measure proposed in this paper. The evidence that can be drawn from the fact that when 
school availability and age on arrival are included in the test score equation and no significant 
changes are observed makes the excludability assumption made in this paper more reliable. 
Whatever the case, it should be borne in mind that, were another sorting mechanism to be 
operating — especially with respect to schools’ unobservable characteristics — the results 
could still contain some bias and must be considered with caution.   
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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5.4 Asymmetries in School Composition Effects  
 
This subsection is concerned with the potential asymmetries in the effects of school 
composition on different subgroups of students, which would represent key evidence for the 
design of public education policies. Specifically, it seeks to investigate the extent to which 1) 
males and females, 2) students with a high and low background and 3) high and low 
performance students (in terms of their test scores) react differently to a given improvement 
in the socio-economic composition at the school level. Therefore, we proceeded as follows: 
equations (3) and (7) and the respective indexes of school composition effects (5 and 8) were 
computed separately for each subgroup in the original sample13. Table 5 contains the 
estimated values for the contextual peer effect measure for each subgroup, as well as the t-
Statistics for the statistical significance of the estimated difference.   
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
First, the results for males and females indicate that without taking into account the 
endogenous sorting process, both subgroups were positively affected by the contextual 
effects. However, it seems that male students profit more than females from an increase in the 
school’s socio-economic composition; in addition, the difference (and its statistical 
significance) increases with the quintiles of the school-average parental human capital. Even 
so, this evidence is completely confounded by the presence of self-selection. In fact, once it is 
accounted for, males appear to be penalized when moving from the first to the second quintile 
of the school-average parental education and are generally insensitive to further 
improvements. By contrast, once the selection process has been accounted for, females seem 
to take significant advantage from an improvement in the socio-economic mix of the school, 
which increased monotonically with the quintiles of the average parental background. This 
result might indicate that male pupils are, in general, more dependent on the effect of 
endogenous grouping of students into schools, whereas females are more directly sensitive to 
the contextual effect created by an increase in the average parental education in the school. 
Second, to analyse the differences by parental background the sample was divided in a 
non-parametric way: following Schneeweis & Winter-Ebmer (2007), students of a “high 
background” are defined as those with parents whose educational attainment is higher than 
                                                 
13
 In this way the parameters of the test score equation for the reference group can differ for each subgroup. Notice that the 
predicted linear score that we use to re-sort students into reference and non-reference groups is the same for the overall 
sample; this decision makes sense because we are interested in analysing how different subgroups of students enrolled in a 
given school respond to a ceteris paribus increase in the school-average parental education — i.e. considering that they are 
originally in the same school, which belongs to a given quintile of the school-average parental education.   
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the school average, while students of a “low background” are defined as those with parents 
whose educational attainment is the same as or less than the school average. In this instance, 
results were less than conclusive. In general, when the measure of the effects of school 
composition includes the endogenous selection we failed to detect any significant differences 
between the subgroups. In addition, when selection was ruled out, we only observed a 
positive and significant difference in favour of “high background” students in the better 
endowed schools (fifth quintile).  
Finally, the same logic was used to divide the sample into students with either high or low 
test scores; specifically, we consider the former to be students whose test score was higher 
than the average score for their grade in that school, whereas the latter are students with a 
poorer test score performance than the school-by-grade average14. The results of the 
asymmetries by student test score indicate that, if we ignore endogenous student sorting, a 
significant difference is only observed in favour of poorer students in the second quintile of 
the school-average parental education. However, no significant difference was observed 
between the two groups for higher values of school socio-economic composition. 
Nevertheless, once endogenous selection is accounted for, high test score students appeared 
to be barely affected by an improvement in the school’s socio-economic composition. By 
contrast, students with low test scores showed a positive and significant reaction, especially 
in the highest quintiles of the school-average parental background.   
    
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Drawing on PISA 2006 data (primarily the science test score), this paper has investigated 
the effects of school composition on Spanish secondary schools. A novel methodology has 
been designed to measure the spillovers produced by one specific exogenous characteristic of 
a student’s schoolmates, namely the highest level of education completed by the parents as an 
index of the school’s socio-economic composition. The proposed methodology relaxes the 
implicit constraint — common to any peer effect study — whereby the contextual element 
can only affect the average outcome through an intercept shift (i.e. a level effect).  
                                                 
14
 In this case we consider the school-by-grade average instead of the simple within-school average in order to take into 
account the marked differences in the test score that are explained by the grade attended. However, these results should be  
treated with caution since this kind of sample separation might generate additional selection bias in the estimates. However, 
the non-parametric strategy used to divide the sample should reduce the potential bias, even maintaining the informative 
content of this evidence. 
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When accounting for all the changes in the educational production function parameter 
generated by an improvement in the school’s socio-economic composition (level and slope 
effects), it was found that school composition effects are substantial and significantly higher 
than those obtained with the constrained specification. More specifically, the results indicate 
that the effect of moving from the least-advantaged schools (those in the first quintile of the 
school-average parental education) to better endowed schools improves the science test score 
in a non-linear way, with the positive effect being particularly pronounced for pupils from top 
schools — i.e. those enrolled in schools where most of the parents had completed upper-
secondary or tertiary education (fifth quintile of the school-average parental education).     
However, this preliminary evidence should not be understood as being the pure 
contextual effect of the school’s socio-economic composition, given that it might be 
confounded by the presence of correlated effects. This paper has explicitly attempted to deal 
with the endogenous selection process whereby students endowed with higher unobserved 
abilities are allocated to better schools (in terms of their socio-economic composition). This 
was achieved by re-sorting students according to a predicted linear score obtained from an 
ordered probit model, which estimates the probability of membership of each quintile of 
school-average parental education. It is argued that, by proxying parental human capital, 
students can be re-sorted in a way that is uncorrelated with unobserved individual 
characteristics.  
When school-composition spillovers were recomputed on the basis of this artificial re-
sorting, the evidence was significantly different. The externalities produced by the parental 
human capital of schoolmates were drastically reduced and they were moderately positive 
only when the school socio-economic composition was comparatively high (in the fourth and 
fifth quintiles). Moreover, additional evidence concerning the asymmetries of the effects of 
school composition revealed major differences between male and female and between high 
and low performance students. It seems that the results of male students are more closely 
affected by endogenous sorting than they are by the exogenous characteristics of their 
schoolmates; by contrast, the results of their female counterparts are more sensitive to the 
positive contextual effect given that school composition effects were greater when “cleaned” 
by self-selection. Furthermore, the subgroup of low performance students appears to be 
positively affected by an improvement in school-average parental background, even after 
accounting for the presence of endogenous sorting.  
Having said this, it is important to bear in mind the potential pitfalls of this study, which 
are linked primarily to the limitations of the database drawn upon. First, it is more than likely 
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that the boundary reported for the effects of school composition is lower than it is in reality, 
given that the somewhat restricted sample of PISA students will cause an attenuation bias in 
our estimate (compare Micklewright et al. 2010). Second, in the case where selection is made 
on the basis of a school’s unobserved characteristics (i.e., those that are not captured by the 
extensive list of school controls included here), the measure of school composition effects 
might still contain some bias. Third, if the variables used as exclusion restrictions are in some 
way correlated with unobserved student abilities, the methodology adhered to here for 
reducing the bias generated by endogenous sorting would not be effective. 
Whatever the case, and even taking these potential limitations into consideration, the 
evidence presented above makes important contributions to the on-going public debate 
concerning school laws and the (re)allocation of certain types of student into other schools.  
First, the relevance of endogenous student sorting raises the question as to just how equitable 
and efficient the zoning laws regulating access to Spain’s secondary schools are. This 
becomes a matter of urgency when it is seen that, with the self-selection of students ruled out, 
the positive impact of enhancing a school’s socio-economic composition is only possible 
when the average parental educational background is comparatively high. This result would 
seem to suggest that the zoning laws are actually impeding students of a low socio-economic 
background from benefiting from a more favourable socio-economic school environment, 
given that they appear to lead to the concentration of such students in disadvantaged school 
environments. This is because families of lower socio-economic standing tend to locate 
systematically in certain residential areas and, as such, their children have restricted access to 
the “better” schools in terms of their socio-economic composition. Although these results do 
not in themselves justify the suppression of the aforementioned zoning laws, they might be 
seen as a justification for seeking to compensate less advantaged students.  
Secondly, evidence pointing to an asymmetric effect in favour of low performance 
students might be deemed an argument in favour of the introduction of more flexible school 
admission policies. Indeed, a more equitable student mix, achieved by reallocating marginal, 
low-performance students into schools with a higher than average socio-economic 
composition, might well reduce inequalities in educational achievement and even increase 
overall results. Whatever the case, a more detailed examination of the relationship between 
existing school laws, school segregation and the effects of school composition is essential if 
we are to clarify any of this evidence. These represent interesting questions for future 
research, particularly if more exhaustive data can be drawn upon. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
Table 1: Description of variables and summary statistics 
 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION mean s.d. 
   
 
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
  
 
age Student’s age in years 15.83 0.286 
female Female student (0-1) 0.496 0.5 
4th grade Student attending 4th grade (0-1) 0.605 0.489 
3rd grade Student attending 3rd grade (0-1) 0.328 0.469 
2nd or 1st grade Student attending 1st grade (0-1) 0.067 0.249 
immigrant of first gen. Student’s immigration status = 
  first generation (0-1) 0.059 0.236 
national language at home Native-born immigrant student speaking    
the national language at home (0-1) 0.974 0.159 
native-foreigner language at home Native-born student speaking  
a foreign language at home (0-1) 0.006 .0075 
immigrant-foreigner language at home Immigrant student speaking  
a foreign language at home (0-1) 0.02 .141 
FAMILY CONTROLS 
 
  
family socio-econ. status Highest socio-economic status index  (ISEI) of the parents 44.95 17 
father's schooling Parental years of schooling  (based on completed ISCED97 levels) 9.945 4.342 
mother's schooling Maternal years of schooling  (based on completed ISCED97 levels) 9.892 4.269 
mother working Mother in regular work (0-1) 0.712 0.453 
# books at home Number of books at home  (mid point of original categories) 155 154.7 
educational resources PISA index of home educational resources 0.238 0.955 
SCHOOL CONTROLS 
 
  
% immigrants at school Proportion of first generation immigrants 0.057 0.092 
% girls at school Proportion of female students 0.497 0.073 
% part-time teachers Proportion of part-time teachers 0.156 0.419 
ability streaming between Students grouped by ability between classes (0-1) 0.501 0.5 
ability streaming within Students are grouped by ability 
within each class (0-1) 0.541 0.498 
pc for instruction ratio Ratio of PCs used for instruction to school size 0.099 0.089 
public school Public school (0-1) 0.65 0.477 
private public-funded  Public funded private school (concertada) (0-1) 0.247 0.431 
private school Private school (0-1) 0.103 0.304 
lack qualified teachers Shortage of qualified teachers (0-1) 0.102 0.302 
school size Total enrollment in school 695.7 347.1 
student/teacher ratio Student teacher ratio 12.4 4.354 
ext. guidance employee External employee providing career  
guidance for students (0-1) 0.8 0.4 
budget autonomy School with budget autonomy (0-1) 0.566 0.496 
teacher hiring autonomy School with teacher hiring autonomy (0-1) 0.315 0.464 
textbook autonomy School with textbook selection autonomy (0-1) 0.927 0.26 
course content autonomy School with course content autonomy (0-1) 0.555 0.497 
course offer autonomy School with course offer autonomy (0-1)  0.522 0.499 
Note: descriptive statistics computed with the final student weight.  
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Table 1: Description of variables and summary statistics (cont.) 
 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION mean s.d. 
   
 
TERRITORIAL CONTROLS 
 
  
small village The school is in a small village (0-1) 0.037 0.189 
village The school is in a village (0-1) 0.258 0.437 
town The school is in a town (0-1) 0.315 0.464 
city The school is in a city (0-1) 0.300 0.458 
large city The school is in a large city (0-1) 0.090 0.286 
Andalusía Region = Andalusía (0-1) 0.214 0.410 
Aragón Region = Aragón (0-1) 0.025 0.156 
Asturias Region = Asturias (0-1) 0.020 0.139 
Cantabria Region = Cantabria (0-1) 0.012 0.108 
Castilla y Leon Region = Castilla y Leon (0-1) 0.052 0.221 
Cataluña Region = Cataluña (0-1) 0.149 0.357 
Galicia Region = Galicia (0-1) 0.059 0.235 
La Rioja Region = La Rioja (0-1) 0.007 0.081 
Navarra Region = Navarra (0-1) 0.012 0.110 
País Basco Region = País Basco (0-1) 0.038 0.191 
Other Regions Region = Other Regions (0-1) 0.413 0.492 
EXCLUDED VARIABLES 
 
 
age on arrival Student’s age on arrival in Spain 0.625 2.551 
no other schools No other schools available (0-1) 0.202 0.401 
one school Only one additional school available (0-1) 0.177 0.382 
more than one school More than one additional school available (0-1) 0.621 0.485 
Note: descriptive statistics computed with the final student weight.  
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Table 2: Eq. (2) estimation results 
Coefficient t-Statistic DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Plausible 
Values for the Science Test Score   
constant 342.14 7.335 
SCHOOL-AVERAGE PARENTAL EDUCATION 
quintile 1 Ref. Cat. 
quintile 2 7.127 1.551 
quintile 3 14.27 2.333 
quintile 4 11.07 1.749 
quintile 5 24.05 3.521 
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS 
  
age 7.261 2.454 
female -17.77 -10.29 
4th grade Ref. Cat. 
3rd grade -71.64 -29.1 
2nd or 1st grade -117.43 -33.15 
immigrant of first gen. -25.47 -4.604 
national language at home Ref. Cat. 
native-foreigner language at home -7.878 -0.577 
immigrant-foreigner language at home -3.502 -0.306 
FAMILY CONTROLS 
  
family socio-econ. status 0.218 2.815 
father's schooling 0.366 1.060 
mother's schooling 0.760 3.014 
mother working 10.24 3.969 
# books at home 0.079 11.59 
educational resources 4.300 4.038 
SCHOOL CONTROLS 
  
% immigrants at school -14.41 -0.728 
% girls at school 48.66 1.854 
% part-time teachers 0.461 0.208 
ability streaming between 1.388 0.445 
ability streaming within -2.812 -0.833 
pc for instruction ratio -32.55 -1.900 
public school Ref. Cat. 
private public-funded  -30.29 -3.657 
private school -24.76 -2.368 
lack qualified teachers 4.739 1.162 
school size -0.001 -0.176 
student/teacher ratio 0.540 0.723 
ext. guidance employee 2.005 0.355 
budget autonomy 4.062 1.079 
teacher hiring autonomy 19.65 2.206 
textbook autonomy 1.557 0.228 
course content autonomy -0.848 -0.242 
course offer autonomy -3.113 -0.710 
TERRITORIAL CONTROLS 
  
small village Ref. Cat. 
village 8.611 1.185 
town -4.577 -1.386 
city 0.930 0.220 
large city 17.76 2.537 
regional dummies yes 
R-squared 0.41 
# observations 19,164 
Plausible Values Regression for PISA data; dummies for missing values included (not shown).  
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 Table 3: School composition spillovers (level + shape effects) 
Panel A 
SCHOOL COMPOSITION SPILLOVERS - 
BASELINE (eq. 5) 
School-Average 
Parental Education IEXj t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group 
quintile 2 4.876 1.153 
quintile 3 12.105 2.235 
quintile 4 26.112 3.010 
quintile 5 71.215 7.802 
mean 27.718 6.920 
Panel B 
SCHOOL COMPOSITION SPILLOVERS – 
SELF-SELECTION CORRECTED (eq. 8) 
School-Average 
Parental Education IEXj* t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group 
quintile 2 -9.808 -2.546 
quintile 3 2.962 0.552 
quintile 4 15.431 3.698 
quintile 5 15.072 3.706 
mean 1.211 0.468 
Note: the test score equations for the reference groups contain the same control 
variables as those included in table 3 and have been estimated with the STATA command “pv”, 
which means the characteristics of the PISA sample can be taken into account, see section 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: School composition spillovers with and without self-selection correction 
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Table 4: Falsification test for the validity of the exclusion restrictions 
Panel A  
SCHOOL COMPOSITION SPILLOVERS – 
BASELINE (eq. 5) 
 
 
School Availability 
included in eq. (3) 
Age on Arrival 
included in eq. (3) 
School Availability 
and Age on Arrival 
included in eq. (3) 
School-Average 
Parental Education IEXj t-Statistic  IEXj t-Statistic IEXj t-Statistic IEXj t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group reference group reference group reference group 
quintile 2 4.876 1.153  4.590 1.049 4.841 1.148 4.544 1.041 
quintile 3 12.105 2.235  12.643 2.288 12.089 2.207 12.639 2.261 
quintile 4 26.112 3.010  26.181 3.119 26.069 3.005 26.132 3.116 
quintile 5 71.215 7.802  71.454 7.713 71.111 7.807 71.322 7.716 
Mean 27.718 6.920  27.826 6.944 27.669 6.909 27.768 6.933 
Panel B  
SCHOOL COMPOSITION SPILLOVERS – 
SELF-SELECTION CORRECTED (eq. 8) 
 
 
School Availability 
included in eq. (7) 
Age on Arrival 
included in eq. (7) 
School Availability 
and Age on Arrival 
included in eq. (7) 
School-Average 
Parental Education IEXj* t-Statistic  IEXj* t-Statistic IEXj* t-Statistic IEXj* t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group  reference group reference group reference group 
quintile 2 -9.808 -2.546  -8.789 -2.249 -11.068 -2.880 -10.063 -2.583 
quintile 3 2.962 0.552  4.947 0.913 1.361 0.254 3.327 0.616 
quintile 4 15.431 3.698  16.940 3.998 13.132 3.105 14.592 3.401 
quintile 5 15.072 3.706  17.413 4.325 12.671 3.210 14.988 3.841 
Mean 1.211 0.468  2.727 1.040 -0.470 -0.183 1.022 0.393 
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  Table 5: Asymmetries in school composition effects 
GENDER DIFFERENCES — BASELINE  
 
Males  Females   
School-Average Parental Education IEXj t-Statistic  IEXj t-Statistic Difference t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group reference group — — 
quintile 2 11.871 1.843  4.121 0.860 7.750 1.186 
quintile 3 5.647 0.449  15.133 3.155 -9.486 -0.772 
quintile 4 45.309 4.000  13.314 1.605 31.995 3.707 
quintile 5 110.965 8.258  44.660 6.101 66.305 6.863 
Mean 42.358 6.084  18.819 5.761 23.539 4.274 
GENDER DIFFERENCES — SELF SELECTION CORRECTED 
 
Males  Females   
School-Average Parental Education IEXj* t-Statistic  IEXj* t-Statistic Difference t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group  reference group — — 
quintile 2 -15.204 -3.036  -6.093 -1.460 -9.111 -2.129 
quintile 3 -9.834 -1.577  14.353 2.823 -24.187 -4.770 
quintile 4 4.361 0.781  26.182 7.941 -21.821 -4.596 
quintile 5 4.125 0.783  30.719 5.853 -26.595 -5.250 
Mean 
-7.638 -2.395  9.484 3.144 -17.122 -5.764 
DIFFERENCES BY TEST SCORE — BASELINE 
 
High Test Score  Low Test Score   
School-Average Parental Education IEXj t-Statistic  IEXj t-Statistic Difference t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group reference group — — 
quintile 2 3.076 0.626  13.803 3.137 -10.727 -3.089 
quintile 3 18.177 3.134  16.225 3.783 1.952 0.560 
quintile 4 32.392 3.588  34.907 4.203 -2.515 -0.506 
quintile 5 82.685 8.634  75.713 10.119 6.972 1.555 
Mean 32.926 7.390  34.436 9.504 -1.510 -0.655 
DIFFERENCES BY PARENTAL BACKGROUND — SELF SELECTION CORRECTED 
 
High Background  Low Background   
School-Average Parental Education IEXj* t-Statistic  IEXj* t-Statistic Difference t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group  reference group — — 
quintile 2 -11.849 -3.590  -11.201 -1.977 -0.648 -0.127 
quintile 3 4.837 0.882  -4.619 -0.715 9.457 1.635 
quintile 4 12.920 2.130  11.942 2.163 0.978 0.121 
quintile 5 19.452 4.095  -0.709 -0.133 20.161 3.431 
Mean 1.293 0.516  -4.119 -1.147 5.412 1.623 
DIFFERENCES BY TEST SCORE — BASELINE 
 
High Test Score  Low Test Score   
School-Average Parental Education IEXj t-Statistic  IEXj t-Statistic Difference t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group reference group — — 
quintile 2 3.076 0.626  13.803 3.137 -10.727 -3.089 
quintile 3 18.177 3.134  16.225 3.783 1.952 0.560 
quintile 4 32.392 3.588  34.907 4.203 -2.515 -0.506 
quintile 5 82.685 8.634  75.713 10.119 6.972 1.555 
Mean 32.926 7.390  34.436 9.504 -1.510 -0.655 
DIFFERENCES BY TEST SCORE — SELF SELECTION CORRECTED 
 
High Test Score  Low Test Score   
School-Average Parental Education IEXj* t-Statistic  IEXj* t-Statistic Difference t-Statistic 
quintile 1 reference group  reference group — — 
quintile 2 -12.955 -3.182  -5.854 -1.292 -7.101 -2.116 
quintile 3 2.589 0.425  3.385 0.692 -0.797 -0.227 
quintile 4 7.517 1.414  19.871 3.366 -12.354 -3.006 
quintile 5 4.620 1.055  16.286 3.498 -11.666 -4.017 
Mean 
-3.052 -1.106  4.048 1.383 -7.100 -3.996 
  NOTE: High Backgound = parental education higher than the school average 
                     Low Backgound = parental education lower than  or equal to the school average 
              High Test Score = test score higher than the school-by-grade test score average 
           Low Test Score = test score lower or equal  than the school-by-grade test score average 
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Appendix  
 
   Table 1A: School composition variable 
School socio-economic composition variable: 
SCHOOL-AVERAGE PARENTAL YEARS OF EDUCATION (HIGHEST) 
 
   
 num. obs. mean s.d. 
quintile 1 (ref. group) 3854 9.144 3.840 
quintile 2 3827 10.752 3.905 
quintile 3 3833 11.725 3.698 
quintile 4 3823 12.699 3.479 
quintile 5 3827 14.562 2.913 
           Note: the years of education are based on the OECD’s standard (ISCED97)  
         for levels of completed education; calculations include the final student weight. 
 
 
 
Table 2A: Ordered Probit estimation results (eq. 6) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 5 quintiles of the  
school-average parental education  
 
Coefficient z-Statistic 
age on arrival -0.034 -4.930 
no other schools Ref. Cat. 
one school 0.348 2.180 
more than one school 0.635 4.040 
small village Ref. Cat. 
village 0.423 2.260 
town 0.391 3.370 
city 0.927 8.490 
large city 1.175 3.970 
Other Regions Ref. Cat. 
Andalusía -0.514 -2.060 
Aragón 0.285 1.360 
Asturias 0.669 3.320 
Cantabria 0.582 3.070 
Castilla y Leon 0.492 2.280 
Cataluña 0.270 1.140 
Galicia 0.285 1.240 
La Rioja 0.414 2.030 
Navarra 0.720 3.620 
País Basco 0.927 5.020 
   
cut-off point 1 0.420  
cut-off point 2 1.136  
cut-off point 3 1.743  
cut-off point 4 2.434  
Number of Observations 19164 
Pseudo R2  0.098 
   Robust standard error with school-clusters (675 schools).  
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